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United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 
PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V. 
KING MOUNTAIN TOBACCO COMPANY, 
INC.; Mountain Tobacco; Delbert L. Wheeler, Sr.; 
Richard Kip Ramsey, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 06-36066. 
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2007. 
Filed Jan. 20, 2009. 
Daniel P. Collins, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, 
Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant. 
J. Michael Keyes, Theresa L. Keyes, and Bart J. 
Freedman, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates 
Ellis LLP, Spokane, WA, for the defendants-ap-
pellees. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Washington; Robert H. Whaley, 
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-
06-03073-RHW. 
Before MEL VIN BRUNETTI, M. MARGARET 
McKEOWN, and WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Cir-
cuit Judges. 
OPINION 
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: 
*1 This case is yet another of the difficult Indian 
jurisdiction cases considered by this court. The pre-
cise question presented is whether there is colorable 
tribal court jurisdiction over a nonmember's federal 
trademark and related state law claims against tribal 
defendants for alleged passing off of cigarettes on 
the Internet, on the reservation of another tribe, and 
elsewhere. Philip Morris USA, Inc. manufactures 
and markets Marlboro cigarettes, one of the most 
recognized brands in the United States. King Moun-
tain Tobacco Company, Inc., a tribal corporation on 
the Yakama Indian Reservation, along with Delbert 
L. Wheeler, Sr. and Richard "Kip" Ramsey, com-
pany founders and members of the tribe 
(collectively, "King Mountain"), sell King Moun-
tain cigarettes in packaging that Philip Morris 
claims infringes and dilutes its trademarks and 
trade dress. 
We are faced with dueling lawsuits. Philip Morris 
sued King Mountain in federal court, alleging vari-
ous federal and state law claims and seeking, 
among other things, injunctive relief against King 
Mountain's continued sale of its products. King 
Mountain followed with an action for declaratory 
relief against Philip Morris in Yakama Tribal 
Court, which prompted Philip Morris to seek an in-
junction in federal court against the tribal proceed-
ings. King Mountain asked the district court to stay 
its proceedings pending the Tribal Court's determ-
ination of its jurisdiction. 
The district court granted King Mountain's reques-
ted stay, concluding there was a colorable claim to 
tribal court jurisdiction under the formulations 
found in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 
(1981), Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 
(1997), and Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
We agree that these cases provide the foundation 
for our analysis, but we disagree that they point to a 
colorable claim of jurisdiction. Rather, we conclude 
that the Tribal Court does not have colorable juris-
diction over nonmember Philip Morris's federal and 
state claims for trademark infringement on the In-
ternet and beyond the reservation. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PRO-
CEEDINGS 
Philip Morris, the maker of Marlboro-brand cigar-
ettes, claims that Marlboro is the most well-known 
and best-selling brand of cigarettes. Philip Morris 
sells Marlboro cigarettes throughout the United 
States and the world, including to stores on the 
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Yakama Reservation. Philip Morris contracts dir-
ectly with some of these stores, while others obtain 
its products through distributors. 
Delbert Wheeler and Richard "Kip" Ramsey are 
both enrolled members of the Yakama Indian Na-
tion. Together they own Mountain Tobacco Com-
pany, d/b/a King Mountain Tobacco Company, 
Inc., which is a corporation that was formed and li-
censed under the laws of the Yakama Indian Nation 
in 2004. King Mountain began selling cigarettes to 
stores on the Yakama Reservation in early 2006, 
and shortly thereafter to members of other Indian 
tribes, including the Onodaga Nation and Seneca 
Tribe in New York, via phone and mail orders. 
King Mountain cigarettes are also sold to the gener-
al public via the Internet, through websites such as 
www .cheap-cig.com and www. l 23smoke.com, but 
King Mountain denies that it markets its cigarettes 
on the Internet or sells directly to those that do. 
There is no contractual or other relationship 
between King Mountain and Philip Morris. 
*2 Philip Morris's Marlboro packaging bears a dis-
tinctive "red roof' design, featuring two red tri-
angles filling the top comers of its otherwise white 
package such that there is a white peak with red 
above it. King Mountain's cigarette packages fea-
ture an image of a snowcovered mountain against a 
red backdrop. Several aspects of Philip Morris's 
package design are registered with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office ("the 
US PTO"). Registration Nos. 938,51 O; 1,544,782; 
and 1,038,989. 
<- Image delivery not included with current Op-
tions setting. -> 
Philip Morris claims that the appearance of King 
Mountain's packaging is a close copy or imitation 
of its Marlboro packaging such that consumers are 
both actually and likely to be confused, that Philip 
Morris's Marlboro trademark is infringed and di-
luted, and alleges that its reputation is tarnished. 
King Mountain, on the other hand, argues that its 
packaging depicts Mt. Adams-known as "Pahto" in 
the Yakama Nation-a mountain of spiritual and cul-
tural significance to the Yakama Tribe and that any 
resemblance to Philip Morris's packaging is inad-
vertent and incidental. King Mountain applied to 
register its package design but the USPTO refused 
registration, citing two of Philip Morris's registra-
tions. 
Philip Morris filed suit against King Mountain in 
federal district court, alleging violations of the Lan-
ham Act and Washington state law. The amended 
complaint includes claims for trademark infringe-
ment, trade dress infringement, trademark dilution, 
and unfair competition. 
King Mountain responded by filing an action for 
declaratory relief in the Yakama Tribal Court, 
claiming that Philip Morris "[had] come upon the 
reservation to do business without permission of the 
Yakama Indian Nation, [was] not licensed thereby, 
and in so doing ... submitted itself to the jurisdic-
tion of the Yakama Tribal Court."King Mountain 
sought a declaration that it was not infringing Philip 
Morris's trademark and trade dress and further al-
leged that Philip Morris's actions violated the 
Yakama Treaty of 1855. Once it received notice of 
this tribal court action, Philip Morris sought an in-
junction in federal court against those proceedings. 
In response to Philip Morris's effort to enjoin King 
Mountain's continued use of its packaging, King 
Mountain argued that Philip Morris had failed to 
exhaust tribal remedies, and that it had not shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits of the Lanham 
Act claims. The district court denied Philip Morris's 
requested injunctions and granted King Mountain's 
motion to stay the federal case to allow the Tribal 
Court to address its own jurisdiction. The district 
court reasoned, relying on Stock West Corp. v. 
Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 9 I 9(9th Cir.1992) (en bane ), 
that "abstention is appropriate where there exists a 
'colorable question' whether the tribal court has 
jurisdiction over the asserted claims."The court 
framed the question as whether "the Yakama Indian 
Nation could regulate the activities at issue in this 
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case" and concluded that "[i]t is not clear that the 
tribe would not have regulatory authority over 
trademarks .... " The court also concluded that it is 
not clear "whether tribal courts have adjudicative 
authority to address trademark claims against tribal 
members whose conduct occurred on reservation 
lands."ln light of these uncertainties, the district 
court held there was a colorable question of the ex-
istence of tribal court jurisdiction over the case. 
*3 On appeal from this order, Philip Morris argues 
that the court improperly denied its motions for in-
junctions and erred in granting King Mountain's 
motion to stay the district court proceedings. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § I 292(a)( 1) to 
review the order denying these injunctions and 
granting the motion to stay the proceedings. Ag-
caoili v. Gustafson, 870 F.2d 462, 463 (9th 
Cir.1989) (holding that jurisdiction over appeal 
from grant of motion to stay is proper under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l)). 
ANALYSIS 
Tribal jurisdiction cases are not easily encapsu-
lated, nor do they lend themselves to simplified 
analysis. The Supreme Court itself observed that 
questions of jurisdiction over Indians and Indian 
country are a "complex patchwork of federal, state, 
and tribal law."Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n. 
I (1990). And we have acknowledged that "(t]here 
is no simple test for determining whether tribal 
court jurisdiction exists."Stock West, Inc. v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 
F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir.1989). Despite these com-
plications, the answer to the tribal jurisdiction ques-
tion in this case can be divined in a logical fashion 
from the teachings of three Supreme Court cases: 
Montana, Strate, and Hicks. These teachings are af-
firmed in important respects by the Court's most re-
cent tribal jurisdiction decision in Plains Commerce 
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S.Ct. 
2709 (2008). 
These cases provide the foundation for the follow-
ing guiding principles. In considering tribal juris-
diction, we look first to the member or nonmember 
status of the unconsenting party, which is, in this 
case, Philip Morris, a nonmember. Hicks, 533 U.S. 
at 382 (Souter, J., concurring) ("It is the member-
ship status of the unconsenting party, not the status 
of real property, that counts as the primary jurisdic-
tional fact.")."As to nonmembers ... a tribe's adju-
dicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative 
jurisdiction."Strate, 520 U.S. at 453. 
Apart from treaties, there are two potential sources 
of tribal jurisdiction: a tribe's inherent sovereignty 
and congressional statutory grant. In general, "the 
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not 
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the 
tribe."Montana. 450 U.S. at 565. This restriction is 
"subject to two exceptions: The first exception 
relates to non-members who enter consensual rela-
tionships with the tribe or its members; the second 
concerns activity that directly affects the tribe's 
political integrity, economic security, health, or 
welfare."Strate, 520 U.S. at 446. 
If neither of the Montana exceptions is applicable, 
we consider "whether such regulatory jurisdiction 
has been congressionally conferred."Hicks, 533 
U.S. at 360. Tribal courts are not, however, courts 
of general jurisdiction, and a mere failure to affirm-
atively preclude tribal jurisdiction in a statute does 
not amount to a congressional expansion of tribal 
jurisdiction. Id. at 367("[The] historical and consti-
tutional assumption of concurrent state-court juris-
diction over federal-law cases is completely miss-
ing with respect to tribal courts .... Tribal courts, it 
should be clear, cannot be courts of general juris-
diction in this sense .... "). Finally, tribal jurisdiction 
is, of course, cabined by geography: The jurisdic-
tion of tribal courts does not extend beyond tribal 
boundaries. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 
U.S. 645,658 n. 12 (2001). 
*4 Taking these principles together, we conclude 
that the Yakama Tribal Court does not have color-
able jurisdiction over King Mountain's tribal action 
for declaratory relief insofar as it implicates Philip 
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Morris's federal trademark infringement claims 
against King Mountain and its principals, members 
of the Yakama Tribe. Thus, exhaustion would 
"serve no purpose other than delay."Strate, 520 
U.S. at 460 n. 14.FN 1To understand the basis for 
this conclusion beyond the summary principles 
cited above, it is useful to begin with an explication 
of the Supreme Court's decision in Montana and 
trace its application through Strate and Hicks. 
FNl. We review de novo the question 
whether exhaustion of tribal court remed-
ies is required. Boozer v. Wilder, 381 F.3d 
93 I, 934 (9th Cir.2004). 
I. THE MONT ANA RULE AND ITS PROGENY 
In Montana, in considering a tribe's authority to im-
pose hunting and fishing restrictions on nonmem-
bers within the reservation, the Supreme Court ex-
amined the scope of tribes' legislative power stem-
ming from their inherent sovereignty, and found it 
narrowly limited with respect to nonmembers. The 
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary 
to protect tribal self-government or to control in-
ternal relations is inconsistent with the dependent 
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without 
express congressional delegation." Montana, 450 
U.S. at 564. From this observation, the Court de-
duced "the general proposition that the inherent 
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend 
to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."ld. at 
565. 
"To be sure," the Court noted, "Indian tribes retain 
inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of 
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reserva-
tions, even on non-Indian fee lands."ld. First, "[a] 
tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or 
other means, the activities of nonmembers who 
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, 
leases, or other arrangements." Id. ( citing Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), and other cases). 
Second, "(a] tribe may also retain inherent power to 
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation when 
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on 
the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 566 (again cit-
ing Williams, 358 U.S. 217, and other cases). Out-
side of these two exceptions, as the Court emphas-
ized in Montana, the tribes' inherent sovereignty 
does not give them jurisdiction to regulate the 
activities of nonmembers. See Plains Commerce 
Bank, 128 S.Ct. at 2720 ("Given Montana's general 
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an 
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-
members of the tribe, efforts by a tribe to regulate 
nonmembers, especially on non-Indian fee land, are 
presumptively invalid.") (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
While delineating the scope of tribes' regulatory 
jurisdiction over nonmembers, Montana did not dir-
ectly address the scope of tribes' adjudicatory juris-
diction. The Supreme Court turned to the question 
of tribal adjudicative jurisdiction sixteen years later 
in Strate. Strate arose out of a traffic accident 
between two nonmembers that occurred on a state 
highway running through the reservation. In sup-
port of tribal court jurisdiction, the plaintiff argued 
that Montana did not apply, because it only ad-
dressed the regulatory jurisdiction of tribes, not 
their adjudicatory jurisdiction. In rejecting this ar-
gument, the Court noted that "[w]hile Montana im-
mediately involved regulatory authority, the Court 
broadly addressed the concept of 'inherent sover-
eignty.' " Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (quoting 
Montana, 450 U.S. at 563). "As to nonmembers," it 
held that "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not 
exceed its legislative jurisdiction. Absent congres-
sional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction, 
we adhere to that understanding. Subject to con-
trolling provisions in treaties and statutes, and the 
two exceptions identified in Montana, the civil au-
thority of Indian tribes and their courts with respect 
to non-Indian fee lands generally 'do[es] not extend 
to the activities of non-members of the tribe.' " Id. 
(quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565) (alteration in 
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original). While leaving open whether tribes' adju-
dicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is narrower 
than the legislative jurisdiction delineated in 
Montana, the Court made clear in Strate that it is, at 
least, no broader. 
*5 Finally, in Hicks, the Court confronted the issue 
of tribal adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers 
stemming not from the tribe's inherent sovereignty, 
the focus of Montana, but from a congressional 
grant. The plaintiff in Hicks was a tribal member 
who sued nonmember state officials under a federal 
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After concluding the tri-
bal court did not have jurisdiction arising from its 
inherent sovereignty under the Montana frame-
work, the Court addressed the argument that tribal 
courts are courts of general jurisdiction and thus 
fully capable of adjudicating § 1983 claims. The 
Court firmly rejected this position, reasoning that 
the "historical and constitutional assumption of 
concurrent state-court jurisdiction over federal-law 
cases is completely missing with respect to tribal 
courts."Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367. It then turned to 
whether the federal statute gave the tribe jurisdic-
tion: "It is true that some statutes proclaim tribal-
court jurisdiction over certain questions of federal 
law .... (But] no provision in federal law provides 
for tribal-court jurisdiction over § 1983 actions." Id. 
at 367-68.The Court went on to note that tribal jur-
isdiction over § 1983 suits wou Id be problematic, 
because the federal removal statute did not provide 
for removal from tribal court, which would deny 
those sued in tribal court the right to a federal for-
um that they would otherwise enjoy. Id. at 368. 
From these three foundational Supreme Court 
cases, we can discern the ground rules governing 
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers. 
As a general rule, tribes do not have jurisdiction, 
either legislative or adjudicative, over non-
members, and tribal courts are not courts of general 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, stemming from their in-
herent sovereignty, tribes do have legislative juris-
diction within the two Montana exceptions. The 
Montana framework is applicable to tribal adjudic-
ative jurisdiction, which extends no further than the 
Montana exceptions. Beyond the jurisdiction they 
enjoy from their inherent sovereignty, tribes may 
also be granted jurisdiction via treaty or congres-
sional statute. 
II. APPLICATION OF TRIBAL JURISDIC-
TION PRINCIPLES 
A. THE MONT ANA EXCEPTIONS 
The evolution of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence 
leaves us with the firm conclusion that we should 
begin our analysis under Montana. While it is un-
clear whether meeting the Montana exceptions is 
sufficient for tribal court jurisdiction-that is, wheth-
er tribal adjudicative jurisdiction extends to the 
boundary of tribal legislative jurisdiction-we have 
no doubt that it is necessary. 
King Mountain, however, argues that Montana is 
not applicable to this case, either in its general rule 
or its exceptions. Rather, King Mountain takes the 
position that Montana only applies to suits in-
volving the activities of nonmembers, i.e., suits 
with nonmember defendants, whereas King Moun-
tain's tribal action for declaratory relief effectively 
involves a tribal member defending the lawfulness 
of its activities against the claims of a nonmember, 
de facto plaintiff. While it is true that the Supreme 
Court has never applied Montana to a case in-
volving a tribal defendant, Montana itself, as well 
as subsequent Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
precedents, supports our conclusion that the 
Montana framework is the starting point for suits 
involving nonmembers generally, whether as 
plaintiffs or defendants. 
*6 In Montana, the Court cited Williams, 358 U.S. 
217, as exemplifying each of the two exceptions to 
its general rule. Importantly, Williams involved a 
suit by a nonmember against a member of the 
Navajo tribe to collect for goods allegedly pur-
chased on credit from the plaintiffs shop within the 
Navajo Reservation. In other words, Williams in-
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volved a member defendant and the activities of 
that member defendant. If, as King Mountain sug-
gests, Montana does not apply to such cases at all, 
it is inconceivable that the Court would have 
chosen Williams to illustrate Montana's exceptions. 
The soundness of this reasoning was confirmed in 
Plans Commerce Bank, where the Court said: "We 
cited four cases in explanation of Montana's first 
exception [including Williams ]. Each involved reg-
ulation of non-Indian activities on the reservation 
that had a discernable effect on the tribe or its 
members." 128 S.Ct. 2721. And, as noted earlier, in 
cases involving non-members, the inquiry focuses 
primarily on whether a non-member is being haled 
into tribal court against his will, not whether the 
party is the plaintiff or defendant. See, e .g., Hicks, 
533 U.S. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring) ("It is the 
membership status of the unconsenting party ... that 
counts as the primary jurisdictional fact."). This ap-
proach does not, however, mean that party align-
ment is not an important factor in the appropriate 
case. FN2 
FN2. Although Judge Fletcher insists that 
we seek to undermine Williams and are un-
faithful to Smith v. Salish Kootenai Col-
lege, 434 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.2006) 
(en bane ), his criticism is without justific-
ation. We faithfully follow Smith, which 
applied Williams within the Montana 
framework in concluding that tribal court 
jurisdiction existed over a non-member's 
suit concerning on-reservation conduct. 
See id. at 1137-40.In Smith, the nonmem-
ber's status as a plaintiff was crucial: "We 
hold that a nonmember who knowingly 
enters tribal courts for the purpose of filing 
suit against a tribal member has, by the act 
of filing his claims, entered into a 
'consensual relationship' with the tribe 
within the meaning of Montana."ld. at 
1140.By contrast, Philip Morris does not 
consent to tribal court jurisdiction, regard-
less of its party alignment as defendant and 
de facto plaintiff. Significantly, we do not 
conclude that party alignment is 
"unimportant," Fletcher Concurrence at 
747; rather, because Philip Morris is un-
consenting, its nonmember status is the 
"primary jurisdictional fact," Hicks, 533 
U.S. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring). 
Although the Supreme Court has never had occa-
sion to consider the Montana exceptions vis-# 2A# 
-vis a tribal defendant, that fact seems more indicat-
ive of the unusual procedural posture of this case 
than the scope of Montana's rule. Questions of ex-
haustion and tribal jurisdiction typically, although 
not always, arise where a tribal member first sues a 
nonmember in tribal court, the nonmember seeks a 
stay against the tribal proceedings in federal court, 
and the federal court must then decide whether to 
defer to the tribal court out of principles of comity. 
This case does not follow this pattern. Rather, here 
it was only after being sued in federal court by 
Philip Morris, the nonmember plaintiff, that King 
Mountain, the member defendant, filed suit in tribal 
court and invoked tribal court jurisdiction. 
Tellingly, the only case the Supreme Court has en-
countered with a similar procedural posture to this 
one was Williams, the very case it cited as exempli-
fying Montana's exceptions. 
Finally, it is significant that this court, s1ttmg en 
bane, recently invoked the Montana analysis in just 
such a case. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 
F.3d 1127, J 131(9th Cir.2006) (en bane) (holding 
exhaustion required in light of a colorable claim to 
tribal jurisdiction based on the first Montana excep-
tion).Smith concerned a tort claim by a student 
against Salish Kootenai College arising out of a 
traffic accident on a federal highway within the 
Flathead Reservation, a reservation controlled by 
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes. Id. at 
1129.Smith, the putative plaintiff, was a member of 
the Umatilla Tribe and thus was considered a non-
member for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 
1132-33.The college was a tribal entity, and thus 
was treated as a member for jurisdictional purposes. 
Id. at 1135.Notwithstanding the presence of a mem-
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ber defendant and nonmember plaintiff, we applied 
Montana. Id. at I 130.Thus, in this circuit, the 
Montana analysis is controlling in tribal jurisdiction 
cases, regardless of the alignment of the member 
and nonmember parties. This is not to say that 
whether the nonmember is a plaintiff or defendant 
is irrelevant to the analysis, but only that the ana-
lysis must take place within the Montana frame-
work, with party alignment in the tribal court action 
as the most important factor to be weighed in de-
termining the application of Montana's rule and ex-
ceptions to the case at hand. See Smith, 434 F.3d at 
113 I ("First, and most important, is the party status 
of the nonmember; that is, whether the nonmember 
party is a plaintiff or defendant.... The Court has re-
peatedly demonstrated its concern that tribal courts 
not require[nonmember defendants] to defend 
themselves against ordinary claims in an unfamiliar 
court."(intemal quotation marks and original brack-
ets omitted)). 
*7 We tum, then, to the Montana exceptions them-
selves. Any initial impression that this case falls 
within the first Montana exception fades quickly 
upon closer inspection. Under that exception, "[a] 
tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or 
other means, the activities of nonmembers who 
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, 
leases, or other arrangements." Montana, 450 U.S. 
at 565. Philip Morris acknowledges that as part of 
its business, it has consensual relationships with tri-
bal members. Stores located on the reservation and 
operated by tribal members sell Marlboro cigar-
ettes. Although the stores purchase from distribut-
ors rather than from Philip Morris, they have mar-
keting arrangements with Philip Morris. The first 
question, however, is whether there is a contract or 
consensual relationship between Philip Morris and 
King Mountain, the tribal member. The answer is 
undisputably no. Philip Morris has no consensual 
commercial relationship with King Mountain; 
rather, they are market competitors. Nor has Philip 
Morris otherwise consented to tribal jurisdiction by 
voluntarily litigating its infringement claims against 
King Mountain in tribal court. Cf Smith, 434 F.3d 
at l l 36(holding Montana's first exception was sat-
isfied because the nonmember consented to tribal 
jurisdiction by choosing to file his claims against a 
tribal member in tribal court). Philip Morris filed its 
claims in federal court and has been haled into tri-
bal court only as an unconsenting, de facto plaintiff 
in King Mountain's tribal action for declaratory re-
lief. 
So, taking the question one step further, we ask 
whether there is a nexus between Philip Morris's 
commercial relationship with various stores oper-
ated by tribal members and the events that give rise 
to this suit for trademark infringement. See Atkin-
son, 532 U.S. at 656(holding that Montana requires 
not only contacts, but contacts related to the events 
out of which the suit arises). We hold there is not. 
The mere fact that a nonmember has some consen-
sual commercial contacts with a tribe does not 
mean that the tribe has jurisdiction over all suits in-
volving that nonmember, or even over all such suits 
that arise within the reservation; the suit must also 
arise out of those consensual contacts. In Atkinson, 
the Supreme Court clarified that "[a] nonmember's 
consensual relationship in one area ... does not trig-
ger tribal civil authority in another-it is not 'in for a 
penny, in for a Pound."Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656 
(citation omitted); see also Strate, 520 U.S. at 
457(holding Montana's first exception inapplicable 
despite consensual commercial relationship with 
the tribe, because the claim was unrelated to that re-
lationship)."Montana's consensual relationship ex-
ception requires that the tax or regulation imposed 
by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the consensual 
relationship itself."Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656. 
*8 In Atkinson, the Navajo Tribe sought to collect a 
hotel tax from all guests at hotels within the reser-
vation boundaries. Although the tax would be im-
posed directly on guests, hotel owners and operat-
ors were charged with collecting it. Atkinson, a 
nonmember proprietor of a hotel located within the 
boundaries of the reservation, brought suit to enjoin 
the tax. The Supreme Court noted that Atkinson's 
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acquisition of a license to transact business within 
the reservation put him in a consensual commercial 
relationship with the tribe. Nevertheless, this rela-
tionship was not enough to support tribal jurisdic-
tion under the first Montana exception, because the 
tribe did not seek to impose the tax on activities 
arising out of that relationship. Id. at 656.Rather, 
the tribe sought to tax the activities of the guests, 
namely staying overnight in a hotel. Thus, the 
Court held, "it is clear that petitioner's 'Indian 
trader' status by itself cannot support the imposi-
tion of the hotel occupancy tax." Id. 
The Court reached a similar conclusion in 
Strate. There, the plaintiff was involved in a traffic 
accident with a nonmember subcontractor of a tri-
bal corporation who "was on the reservation to per-
form landscaping work for the Three Affiliated 
Tribes at the time of the accident...."Atkinson, 532 
U.S. at 656. The plaintiff sued in tribal court, 
claiming jurisdiction under the first Montana ex-
ception, but the Court determined the tribal court 
was without jurisdiction. It held that "[a]lthough 
[the subcontractor] was engaged in subcontract 
work on the Fort Berthold Reservation, and there-
fore had a consensual relationship with the Tribes, 
[the plaintiff] was not a party to the subcontract, 
and the Tribes were strangers to the 
accident."Strate, 520 U.S. at 457(intemal quota-
tions omitted). 
Here we face a similar situation. King Mountain 
claims tribal jurisdiction exists over this suit under 
the first Montana exception, and it points to Philip 
Morris's sales and contracts with stores within the 
reservation for the requisite consensual commercial 
relationship. The fatal flaw with this position is the 
same as that in Atkinson and Strate: there is no nex-
us between these contacts and the activity giving 
rise to this lawsuit. Atkinson teaches that under the 
first Montana exception, a tribe has authority to tax 
a nonmember where the tax has a nexus to the 
"consensual relationship." In extending the 
Montana framework to the question of a tribal 
court's adjudicative jurisdiction, we hold that a tri-
bal court has jurisdiction over a nonmember only 
where the claim has a nexus to the consensual rela-
tionship between the nonmember and the disputed 
commercial contacts with the tribe. 
This suit is not about the marketing contracts 
between Philip Morris and a handful of stores on 
the reservation. Indeed, King Mountain is not a 
party to any of these contracts, nor does it allege 
any sort of consensual relationship with Philip Mor-
ris. Rather, the suit is about nationwide sales, in-
cluding on the Internet and on other reservations, of 
King Mountain cigarettes. As in Strate, the tribal 
stores are "strangers" to the trademark infringement 
claim, 
*9 King Mountain's argument that both Philip Mor-
ris's contacts with the tribe and the conduct com-
plained of involve the sale of cigarettes is not un-
like the tribe's argument in Atkinson. There, the tribe 
took the view that it could force a hotel owner to 
collect a tax, because he had a license to operate a 
hotel and the tax involved hotel guests. While the 
subject matter was loosely the same, the required 
relationship between the two scenarios was miss-
ing. The acts out of which this Lanham Act suit 
arises are completely independent of Philip Morris's 
contacts with the tribe. Even if Philip Morris had 
never entered into these relationships, its lawsuit 
would be exactly the same. Unlike a breach of con-
tract claim where the unconsenting party was also a 
party to the contract, see Williams, 358 U.S. at 
2 I 7-18, or a misrepresentation and malpractice 
claim against a tribe's legal representative, see 
Stock West, 964 F.2d at 914-16, the acts com-
plained of do not arise out of the nonconsenting 
party's contacts with the tribe. This case, therefore, 
falls outside of Montana's first exception. 
Finally, it bears noting that this case is distinguish-
able from other cases by virtue of the breadth of the 
challenged activity. Virtually all of the cases that 
have held tribal exhaustion is required have con-
cerned a single incident occurring on or near tribal 
land or a contract directly with a tribal member. See 
e.g., Strate, 520 U.S. at 442 (car accident); Willi-
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ams, 358 U.S. at 217- I 8 ( unpaid bill). In contrast, 
this is a suit by the holder of a federally-registered 
trademark for trademark infringement, unfair com-
petition, and passing off through worldwide Inter-
net sales and off-reservation sales to tribes in New 
York. The focus of the complaint is the passing off, 
which occurs beyond the reservation boundaries 
and, according to Atkinson, beyond tribal jurisdic-
tion. See also Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S.Ct. at 
2719-20( emphasizing that tribal sovereignty stems 
from the tribes' rights to control their land, and does 
not extend beyond reservation boundaries). Even 
though King Mountain disclaims direct responsibil-
ity for the sales, the complaint is against the pres-
ence of its cigarettes in the nationwide market. That 
King Mountain may also sell its cigarettes on the 
reservation does not alter the nationwide geograph-
ic scope of Philip Morris's claims. 
As for the second exception, the claims in this case 
are not of the type the Court had in mind when it 
carved out an exception for tribal jurisdiction over 
"conduct[that] threatens or has some direct effect 
on the political integrity, the economic security, or 
the health or welfare of the tribe,"Montana, 450 
U.S. at 566. The Yakama Tribe is not itself a party 
to this case. To some extent, it can be argued that 
torts committed by or against Indians on Indian 
land always "threaten[ ] or ha[ve] some direct ef-
fect on the political integrity, the economic secur-
ity, or the health or welfare of the tribe."/d. But this 
generalized threat that torts by or against its mem-
bers pose for any society, is not what the second 
Montana exception is intended to capture. See 
Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 657 n. 12 ("Montana's second 
exception can be misperceived. The exception is 
only triggered by nonmember conduct that threatens 
the Indian tribe; it does not broadly permit the exer-
cise of civil authority wherever it might be con-
sidered necessary to self-govemment."(intemal 
quotations omitted)). Rather, the second exception 
envisions situations where the conduct of the non-
member poses a direct threat to tribal sovereignty. 
Id. Pursuit of federal and state trademark claims 
hardly poses a threat of that nature. 
*10 It appears that in analyzing tribal sovereignty 
the district court imported a general notion of tribal 
regulatory authority unhinged from the Montana 
exceptions. The district court predicated its holding 
on the possibility of general tribal authority to regu-
late trademarks. But the question of tribal regulat-
ory authority over nonmembers is linked, under 
Montana, to the two specific exceptions, not to a 
broad notion ofregulatory authority. 
Whether the tribe may adopt its own trademark sys-
tem is not at issue here. But surely the district court 
is not suggesting that the tribe would have regulat-
ory authority over federal trademark registration. 
Significantly, Philip Morris holds federal trade-
marks and trade dress registered under the Lanham 
Act, trademarks whose validity King Mountain ap-
parently challenges. Seel5 U.S.C. § l l 19(under 
federal law, the courts and the Patent and Trade-
mark Office have concurrent jurisdiction over can-
cellation proceedings: "the court may determine the 
right to registration, order the cancellation of regis-
trations ... and otherwise rectify the register with re-
spect to the registrations of any party to the ac-
tion"). The presence of this federal regulatory 
scheme highlights a further complication and un-
derscores why the inquiry must be tethered to 
Montana. 
B. HICKS AND THE LANHAM ACT 
Although the Tribal Court has no jurisdiction over 
this case arising from its inherent sovereignty, be-
cause it does not fall within either of the Montana 
exceptions, Hicks leaves open a second basis for 
tribal jurisdiction: a congressional statutory grant. 
Hicks examined whether tribal courts have jurisdic-
tion to entertain federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. In rejecting the claim that tribal courts are 
courts of general jurisdiction and thus are an appro-
priate venue for federal civil rights claims, the 
Court deemed that contention "quite wrong" and re-
iterated that, unlike state courts of general jurisdic-
tion, "a tribe's inherent adjudicative jurisdiction 
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over nonmembers is at most only as broad as its le-
gislative jurisdiction." Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367. The 
Court resolved that Congress did not enlarge tribal-
court jurisdiction vis-# 2A# -vis § 1983. 
Applying the same principles to the Lanham Act, 
we conclude that the Lanham Act "is not such an 
enlargement." Id. at 366 n. 7. Nothing in the Lan-
ham Act suggests that it was intended by Congress 
to expand tribal jurisdiction. In fact, the Act makes 
no mention of tribes at all. Hicks noted with respect 
to § 1983, "tribal-court jurisdiction would create 
serious anomalies" including the inability to exer-
cise removal options. Id. at 368.A further sover-
eignty anomaly would be created under the Lanham 
Act because of the courts' ability to cancel a feder-
ally-granted trademark, see15 U.S.C. § 1119, an 
historical and constitutional interplay between fed-
eral law and state-court jurisdiction that "is com-
pletely missing with respect to tribal courts."Hicks, 
533 U.S. at 367. Philip Morris argues that tribes 
never have jurisdiction over federal statutory 
claims, unless Congress explicitly grants it to them. 
King Mountain argues that Tribal Courts always 
have jurisdiction over such claims, unless Congress 
explicitly precludes it. Both of these positions mis-
read Hicks; Congress may, via statute, expand or 
contract tribal jurisdiction, but where Congress is 
silent-as in the Lanham Act-tribal jurisdiction rests 
on inherent sovereignty, and its scope is prescribed 
by Montana. Hicks does not, as Philip Morris sug-
gests, stand for a rule that tribes have no jurisdic-
tion over federal statutory claims absent an explicit 
statutory grant. Hicks therefore provides no addi-
tional basis for or against tribal jurisdiction in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
*11 For the above reasons, we hold that the 
Yakama Tribal Court has no colorable claim to jur-
isdiction over this dispute.FN3Given the circum-
stances, exhaustion of Philip Morris's claims would 
serve no purpose beyond delay, and is therefore in-
appropriate. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 369. 
FN3. Philip Morris's complaint does not al-
lege claims based on King Mountain's 
sales of its cigarettes on the Y akama Re-
servation, although there are passing refer-
ences to such sales in later pleadings. To 
the extent that Philip Morris challenges 
King Mountain's sales activities to stores 
on the reservation, tribal court exhaustion 
would be appropriate as to those claims, as 
there would be a colorable claim that 
Philip Morris's voluntary decision to sell 
its cigarettes within the Reservation sup-
plies the requisite voluntary commercial 
relationship to meet Afontana's first excep-
tion with respect to claims arising in that 
market. Cf Smith, 434 F.3d at 
l 132("where the non-members are the 
plaintiffs, and the claims arise out of com-
mercial activities within the reservation, 
the tribal courts may exercise civil juris-
diction"); see also Ford Motor Co. v. To-
decheene, 488 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th 
Cir.2007) ("[a party] will be deemed to 
have exhausted its tribal remedies once the 
[tribe's highest court] either resolves the 
jurisdictional issue or denies a petition of 
discretionary interlocutory review pursuant 
to [tribal law.]"). 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in judg-
ment: 
I concur in the judgment. 
King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc., and 
Yakama Tribe members Delbert Wheeler and 
Richard "Kip" Ramsey (collectively, "tribal mem-
ber defendants" or "defendants") allegedly in-
fringed federal and state trademark rights of Philip 
Morris by selling cigarettes with packaging and 
designs that resemble those of Philip Morris's flag-
ship Marlboro brand. Philip Morris sued the de-
fendants in federal district court for trademark in-
fringement. The defendants responded by suing 
Philip Morris in tribal court, seeking a declaratory 
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judgment that their packaging, designs, and sales do 
not infringe. The tribal member defendants are ac-
tual defendants in the district court coercive suit 
and de facto defendants in the tribal court declarat-
ory judgment suit. See Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
The district court appears to have thought that sales 
both on and off the Yakama Reservation are at is-
sue in this case. The district court noted in its order 
granting the stay that "Defendants began selling 
King Mountain cigarettes to smoke shops on the 
Yakama Reservation in January 2006" and later 
began to make off-reservation sales. The district 
court concluded that because Philip Morris's federal 
court suit made "claims against tribal members 
whose conduct occurred on reservation lands ... 
there exists a colorable question of the existence of 
tribal court jurisdiction in this case over Philip 
Morris." 
The panel majority makes clear, however, that sales 
by defendants of King Mountain cigarettes on the 
Yakama Reservation are not at issue. It writes, 
"Philip Morris's complaint does not allege claims 
based on King Mountain's sales of its cigarettes on 
the Yakama Reservation, although there are passing 
references to such sales in later pleadings."Maj. op. 
at 741 n. 3. Because the only sales at issue took 
place off the Yakama Reservation, the question in 
this appeal is straightforward and quite narrow: 
Does the Yakama Tribal Court have colorable juris-
diction to decide whether off-reservation sales by 
tribal member defendants infringe the Marlboro 
trademark? The panel majority answers, correctly, 
that it does not. 
The panel majority could have written a simple 
opinion relying on Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544 (1981 ). There the Supreme Court wrote that 
Indian tribes retain their inherent power to de-
termine tribal membership, to regulate domestic 
relations among members, and to prescribe rules 
of inheritance for members. But exercise of tribal 
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations is 
inconsistent with the dependent status of the 
tribes, and so cannot survive without express 
congressional delegation. 
*12 450 U.S. at 564 (internal citation omitted). The 
Court then noted two exceptions to the limitation 
on tribal power and tribal court jurisdiction. First, 
even on reservation land owned in fee simple by 
non-Indians a "tribe may regulate ... the activities 
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships 
with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements."/d. at 565( citations omitted). 
Second, tribal jurisdiction extends to "conduct of 
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation 
when that conduct threatens or has some direct ef-
fect on the political integrity, the economic secur-
ity, or the health or welfare of the tribe."/d. at 566 
( citations omitted). 
Under Montana, the tribal court clearly lacks juris-
diction over this suit, which arose out of off-
reservation conduct by tribal members that al-
legedly violated non-tribal law and injured a non-
tribal member. The first Montana exception does 
not apply because the allegedly infringing conduct 
took place off the reservation, and because Philip 
Morris is not in a consensual relationship with the 
defendants. The second exception does not apply 
because the conduct took place off the reservation, 
and because Philip Morris's legal claims do not 
threaten the "political integrity, the economic se-
curity, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 
Rather than deciding this case based simply on 
Montana, the panel majority engages in extended 
dicta in an attempt to undermine the longstanding 
presumption of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 
(1959). In Williams, a non-member store owner 
brought suit against Navajo tribal members for 
goods bought on credit at a store located on the 
Navajo Reservation. The Court upheld tribal court 
jurisdiction. Williams has long stood for the propos-
ition that a tribal court has jurisdiction over a civil 
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suit arising out of on-reservation conduct brought 
by a non-member plaintiff against a member de-
fendant. See, e.g., Cohen's Handbook of Federal In-
dian Law 608 (2005) (discussing Williams and stat-
ing that "[s]tate courts lack jurisdiction to hear ac-
tions against Indians arising within Indian coun-
try"). 
In its dicta, the panel majority seeks to undercut the 
Williams presumption concerning party alignment-
that a tribal court has jurisdiction over suits 
between members and non-members arising out of 
on-reservation conduct when the non-member is a 
plaintiff and the member is a defendant, though not 
when the member is a plaintiff and the nonmember 
is a defendant. For example, the panel majority 
writes, "While it is true that the Supreme Court has 
never applied Montana to a case involving a tribal 
defendant, Montana itself, as well as subsequent 
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedents, sup-
ports our conclusion that the Montana framework is 
the starting point for suits involving nonmembers 
generally, whether as plaintiffs or defendants." 
Maj. op. at 732 (emphasis added). It writes further, 
"[I)n cases involving nonmembers, the inquiry fo-
cuses on whether a nonmember is being haled into 
tribal court against his will, not whether the party is 
the plaintiff or defendant."/d at 732.And it writes, 
"Although the Supreme Court has never had occa-
sion to consider the Montana exceptions vis-# 2A# 
-vis a tribal defendant, that fact seems more indicat-
ive of the unusual procedural posture of this case 
than the scope of Montana's rule."/d. at 
733.Finally, it writes, "Tellingly, the only case the 
Supreme Court has encountered with a similar pro-
cedural posture to this one was Williams, the very 
case it cited as exemplifying Montana's excep-
tions."/d at 733. 
*13 In minimizing the importance of party align-
ment, the panel majority ignores our recent en bane 
analysis in Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 
F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.2006} (en bane}. The three-
judge panel in Smith had held that the tribal court 
did not have jurisdiction over a civil suit arising out 
of a rollover accident on the reservation in which 
the plaintiff was a nonmember and the defendant 
was a member. The panel had concluded that the 
Montana framework applies "whenever there is a 
non-member party ."Smith v. Salish Kootenai Col-
lege, 378 F.3d 1048, I 052 (9th Cir.2004). The pan-
el wrote that the "Supreme Court has not distin-
guished between non-member plaintiffs and non-
member defendants."/d at n. 5. Based on this ana-
lysis, the three-judge panel concluded that the tribal 
court did not have jurisdiction. 
Our en bane panel reversed. The en bane majority 
explicitly disagreed with the three-judge panel's 
conclusion that the alignment of parties is irrelevant 
to the jurisdictional analysis: 
The Court's recent cases, and our own experience 
with the Montana exceptions, demonstrate that 
there are two facts courts look to when consider-
ing a tribal court's civil jurisdiction over a case in 
which a non-member is a party. First, and most 
important, is the party status of the nonmember; 
that is, whether the nonmember party is a 
plaintiff or a defendant.... The Court has re-
peatedly demonstrated its concern that tribal 
courts not require "defendants who are not tribal 
members" to "defend [themselves against ordin-
ary claims] in an unfamiliar court."Second, the 
Court has placed some store in whether or not the 
events giving rise to the cause of action occurred 
within the reservation. Within the reserva-
tion,"[t]o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent 
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians ... even on non-
Indian fee lands .... " 
The interaction of these factors-the status of the 
parties and the connection between the cause of 
action and Indian lands-is complex. Nevertheless, 
the cases provide some guidance for our discus-
sion, and we can summarize them as follows. 
First, where the nonmembers are the plaintiffs, 
and the claims arise out of commercial activities 
within the reservation, the tribal courts may exer-
cise civil jurisdiction. Second, where the non-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
1/23/09 
--- F.3d ---- Page 13 
--- F.3d ----. 2009 WL I 15589 (C.A.9 (Wash.)), 09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 677 
(Cite as: 2009 WL l I 5589 (C.A.9 (Wash.))) 
members are defendants, the Court has thus far 
held that the tribes lack jurisdiction, irrespective 
of whether the claims arose on Indian lands. 
434 F.3d at l l 3 l-32(first emphasis added; later em-
phases in original; brackets in original; citations 
omitted). 
Judge Gould, who had written the panel opinion in 
Smith, dissented from the en bane opinion. He wrote: 
The plain language of Montana indicates that its 
framework applies to legal actions involving 
"non-members" without limitation.... Moreover, 
in illustrating the application of the Montana 
framework, the Court has used Williams to illus-
trate examples of the Montana framework, indic-
ating that nonmember plaintiffs, as well as non-
member defendants, fall within that doctrine. 
*14 Id. at 1141-42 (Gould, J., dissenting). The oth-
er two members of the three-judge panel in Smith-
who had joined Judge Gould in concluding that 
party alignment is unimportant in determining tribal 
court jurisdiction-were Judges McKeown and Bru-
netti. Judges McKeown and Brunetti, who comprise 
the panel majority in the case now before us, were 
not members of the en bane panel in Smith. 
As in the three-judge panel decision in Smith, the 
panel majority in this case minimizes the import-
ance of party alignment. The panel majority justi-
fies its conclusion that party alignment is unimport-
ant in two ways. First, it relies on two string cita-
tions of Williams in Montana.Maj. op. at 732-33. 
But those citations in no way suggested that 
Montana was intended to undermine the Williams 
presumption in favor of jurisdiction when a tribal 
member is a defendant. Moreover, Montana was 
decided long before our en bane decision in Smith; 
indeed, the meaning of Montana and Williams was 
central to our analysis in that case. Thus, string 
citations of Williams in Montana can hardly be 
used to escape our emphasis in Smith on the import-
ance of party alignment. 
Second, the panel maJonty relies on the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Plains Commerce Bank v. 
Long Family Land and Cattle Co ., 128 S.Ct. 2709 
(2008). Maj. op. at 732. But in that case the Court 
held that a tribal court did not have jurisdiction 
over a suit brought by member plaintiffs against a 
nonmember defendant. Because a nonmember rather 
than a member was the defendant, the Williams pre-
sumption in favor of tribal court jurisdiction was 
not at issue. Moreover, the Court cited Williams 
with approval, giving no hint that it intended to cut 
back or otherwise limit the Williams presumption. 
128 S.Ct. at 2721. 
Much of the panel majority's discussion in this case 
is dicta, and much of that dicta is contrary to Su-
preme Court case law and to our en bane opinion in 
Smith. Therefore, while I concur in the judgment, I 
respectfully decline to join the panel majority's 
opinion. 
C.A.9 (Wash.),2009. 
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